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Abstract 
Current controversies in social psychology have sparked the promotion of new rules for 
evidence in the field. This ³FULVLVof evidence´ echoes prior concerns from the 1970¶V about a so-
called ³FULVLVRIVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\´, with such issues as replication and statistical significance 
once more under examination. I argue that parallel concerns about the relevance of our research, 
UDLVHGEXWQRWFRPSOHWHO\UHVROYHGLQWKH¶VFULVLVDOVRGHVHUYHDIUHVKORRN. In particular, 
the advances made in the current crisis of evidence came about because of changes in academic 
career incentives--particularly publishing. Today, many voices in psychology urge greater 
respect for relevance in topics, methods and communication, but the lack of clear and concrete 
incentives to do so has stood in the way of answers. I diagnose the current incentive structures, 
propose partial solutions that are within the reach of journal editors and professional societies, 
and conclude by discussing the links between relevance and evidence, as well as special 
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From crisis of evidencHWRD³FULVLV´RIUHOHYDQFH",QFHQWLYH-based answers for social 
SV\FKRORJ\¶VSHUHQQLDOUHOHYDQFHZRUULHV 
 
If the multitude of social-psychological findings cannot aid the planners of society, 
it is apparently not because we have been researching the wrong topics. It must be 
that our data are not generalizable to the objects of our studies in their natural, 
ongoing states. This is a basic inadequacy of methodology rather than direction, and 
it will not be resolved by pontifical edicts from any source about what to study and 
where. -- Silverman (1971), p. 583 
 
 
Whether social psychology research can be relevant to anyone but social psychologists is a 
TXHVWLRQRIWHQSXWLQWKHIRUPRID³relevance FULVLV´Can our ways of research create solutions 
to real-world social problems? Do our findings reach a wider audience, or echo in a sealed 
chamber? Crisis questions of many different kinds have reared up in social psychology, time and 
DJDLQILUVWLQWKH¶VDQGUHDFKLQJDSHDNLQWKHHDUO\¶VRecent years have seen 
continued criticism of the discipline of social psychology for failing to value research in applied 
settings, for relying on limited populations and artificial measures, and for not effectively 
communicating a great deal of its findings to the public. Regardless of whether the fault is seen 
in the content of the research itself, its methodology, or its dissemination, the common element 
in relevance-based critiques is a failure to connect theory with the lives of everyday people. 
Psychology seems to draw recurring criticism as a discipline that fails to deliver things of interest 
and utility to end-users and members of the public, whether the fault is in the ecological validity 
of the research itself, its applicability to problems, or its dissemination. 
Whether or not these criticisms are justifiedOHWDORQHFRQVWLWXWHD³relevance FULVLV´ is 
difficult to establish, and quite subjective. It is easy to point to success stories, but harder to 
judge how typical they are. It is, however, clear that highly respected figures in psychology²
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best-selling authors, presidents of professional organizations²are prone to expressing discontent 
that relevance is not more respected within academic psychology, as I will show in more detail. 
Thus, by definition, relevance in psychology has an image problem. However, it is not often that 
these criticisms include concrete suggestions to change the incentives in the field. As a model for 
change, I will look at another avenue of criticism of social psychology often called D³FULVLV´± 
the recent focus on reforming standards of evidence, including changes to reporting and 
statistics, and increased promotion of replication. We can ODEHOWKLVVHWRILVVXHVWKH³HYLGHQFH
FULVLV´LQFRQWUDVWZLWKWKH³UHOHYDQFHFULVLV´which I will later describe. 
$EULHIRYHUYLHZRIWKH³HYLGHQFHFULVLV´DQGZKDWLWKDVFKDQJHG 
The first appearance of a crisis of evidence in social psychological research came in the 
¶VDQG¶VSocial psychologists began to express doubts about the methodological 
validity of their research: this was evident, for example, in debates on the usefulness of the 
attitude construct in predicting behaviour (Wicker, 1964), and the influence of experimenter 
demand both overt and subtle (Orne, 1962; Rosenthal, 1963). These doubts shook the field, 
generating solutions as radical as to abandon the natural science paradigm in psychology 
(Gergen, 1973; N. C. Smith, 1970). Others urged greater sophistication within existing 
paradigms, such as a more precise re-specification of the attitude-behaviour problem (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1977). 
However, the criticism with the most resonance today went beyond the specific methods of 
social psychology, and focused on the common practice of declaring an effect to be true based on 
a single statistically significant null hypothesis test of p < .05. This criterion of truth, because it 
encouraged publication and analytic bias in favour of significant results, was seen as risking 
unsupported conclusions (e.g., Sterling, 1959; Lykken, 1968). At the same time, some authors of 
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literature reviews observed that single published experimental results often failed to replicate, 
leading to an overall equivocal literature (e.g., Sears & Freedman, 1967, on selective exposure 
effects). Numerous solutions were proposed in psychology journals: publishing null as well as 
significant results (Greenwald, 1975), improving the statistical power of studies (Cohen, 1962), 
reporting power, effect sizes and confidence intervals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), and internal 
replication of effects within a lab (Lykken, 1968; N. C. Smith, 1970).   Social and personality 
psychologists such as Sears, Lykken, and Greenwald were well-represented among these critics 
and reformers.  
Through the following decades, it became clear that many of the concerns had not led to 
real changes in reporting. Statistical power of typical experiments did not greatly improve 
(Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989; Fraley & Vazire, 2014). While replications were urged in theory 
(e.g., Fishman & Neigher, 1982), papers that only replicated existing results were not easily 
published (Makel, Plucker & Hegarty, 2012), and setting up special journals for them was not a 
great success (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Reporting of effect sizes was also rare (Greenwald, 
Gonzalez, Harris, & Guthrie, 1986). The long-awaited recommendations of the APA Task Force 
on Statistics (Wilkinson and APA Task Force, 1999) were not generally put into practice across 
psychology journals (Cumming, Fidler et al., 2007; Vankov, Bowers & Munafo, 2014). The 
APA recommendations included requests to report effect sizes for all major tests, eschew post-
hoc testing, refrain from making causal claims on the mere basis of multivariate modelling, and 
over 70 other desiderata of publishing.  Ten years after the Task Force report, out of the 10 most 
FLWHGDUWLFOHVLQ$3$¶VJournal of Personality and Social Psychology in 2009 as determined by 
Google Scholar (April 3, 2017), four reported no effect size or confidence interval for their main 
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findings, and one reported effect sizes for some tests but not others. One has to wonder whether 
the comprehensiveness of these guidelines was a hindrance to their implementation.  
And yet after the first crisis social/personality psychology did adopt one change of practice 
to quell doubts about significance testing. Articles with multiple studies, each replicating a 
common hypothesis with a significant effect, became the norm at the most prestigious journals. 
Increasingly, journal editors asked for additional studies supporting the point, or asked single-
study authors to come back when they had more evidence. Although not often enshrined in 
explicit policies or editorials, the new quasi-requirement was visible enough to complain about 
(Wegner, 1992), and spread through word-of-mouth communication. This hand on the levers of 
journal publishing changed the look of social psychology. For example, the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) increased its proportion of multi-study articles 
VWHDGLO\IURPWKH¶VDQGHQGHGXSLQZLWKDQDYHUDJHRIVWXGLHVSHUDUWLFOH5HLV	
Stiller, 1992; Witte & Brandt, 2009).  
 The story of the second evidence crisis in 2011 has been told more comprehensively 
elsewhere (Spellman, 2015). Briefly, after %HP¶Vnine-study paper purporting to establish 
the existence of precognition was published in JPSP, the multi-study solution seemed an 
inadequate safeguard against false positives. That year, too, several high-profile fraud cases in 
social psychology threw kerosene on the fires of reform. Subsequent analyses showed that 
selective reporting of analyses and studies was almost certainly going on (Schimmack, 2012), 
that it could be a problem for inference even in multi-study papers (Simmons, Nelson & 
Simonsohn, 2011), and that the problem was aided by the exclusive evaluation of research by p-
value thresholds, ignoring statistical power and effect sizes (Cumming, 2014). Also, concerns in 
WKH¶VWKDW multi-study publishing slowed down the field had led some journals, such as 
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Psychological Science and Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (JESP), to introduce 
formats for short reports of single studies, partially repealing the multi-study solution. The short-
articles trend, too, had its critics (Ledgerwood & Sherman, 2012). 
Post-2011, however, much more attention than before has been paid to the role of 
publishing in moving the discipline past incomplete reporting and irreproducible results (e.g., 
Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012). Suggestions for change have been kept simple (e.g., 21- or 18-word 
statements enforcing disclosure of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions;  LeBel, 
Borsboom, et al, 2013; Simmons, Neilson & Simonsohn, 2012DQGFRQFUHWHHJD³QHZ
VWDWLVWLFV´UHTXLULQJUHSRUWLQJRIFRQILGHQFHLQWHUYDOVDURXQGHIIHFWVL]HV&XPPLQJ7KH
Center for Open Science (COS) has codified the Transparency and Openness Principles (TOP) 
guidelines and Open Science badges, which spell out concrete practices that journals can 
officially adopt at various levels (Nosek, Alter, et al., 2015), such as complete reporting of 
results, sharing of data and materials, and encouragement of replications and pre-registration. 
The COS has also chosen to hand out incentives in the most direct way possible, by offering one 
thousand grants of one thousand dollars to researchers across the sciences who pre-register their 
studies (Preregistration Challenge, 2017). 
Uptake of these proposals has been mixed, with journals supporting guidelines more in 
principle than in practice (Center for Open Science, 2018). However, enough time has passed 
post-crisis to observe that journal editorial teams now usually feel a need to do something 
different about evidence: requiring disclosure of all measures and manipulations, moving away 
from the p < .05 criterion, requesting verbatim materials for review, requiring confidence 
intervals, asking for statistical power to be addressed in each article, requiring a certain level of 
statistical power, and opening the door to direct replications and preregistered studies (for 
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various subsets of these innovations, see these selected editorials: at JESP, Giner-Sorolla, 2016; 
at JPSP, Kitayama, 2017 and Cooper, 2016; at PSPB, Crandall, Leach, Robinson and West, 
2017; at Psychological Science, Eich, 2014 and Lindsay, 2015; at SPPS, Vazire, 2016). At a 
FRXSOHRI\HDUV¶GLVWDQFHIURPWKHHDUOLHVWRIWKHVHFhanges, there is some evidence that adopting 
them has moved publication in the desired direction (Tressoldi, Cumming, Fresc, & Giofré, 
2016).  
In an earlier essay (Giner-6RUROOD,JDYHHYLGHQFHIRUDQDUURZLQJ³ERWWOHQHFN,´
pitting increasing numbers of social psychologists against much more slowly increasing numbers 
of journal and career slots (see also Pratkanis, 2017). 7KH³FULVLVRIHYLGHQFH´KDVVKRZQXVWKDW
under severe competition, norms have a chance to change only when practices visibly enable the 
immediate achievement of markers of excellence such as grants, awards, jobs and articles. But 
norms have little chance to change when incentives are distant and vague; are couched in terms 
of approval rather than benefit; and ask researchers to act individually in taking unrewarded risks 
for the future good of the discipline. This lesson, I will argue, also applies to issues of social 
SV\FKRORJ\¶VUHOHYDQFH. 
 
Three facets of relevance criticism, in history 
Writings mentioning a relevance ³FULVLV´LQVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\date back to before the 
Second World War. Throughout this literature, evidence and relevance concerns have appeared 
in parallel. An early polemic (Britt, 1937) noted that students yawn at abstruse, idiosyncratic 
armchair theories but show far more interest in empirical answers to social questions -- ³µ7R
ZKDWH[WHQWGRQHZVSDSHUVSULQW³WUXH´QHZV"¶µ:KDWDUHWKHXQGHUO\LQJP\WKVDQGOHJHQGVWKDW
FDXVHIULFWLRQEHWZHHQ*HQWLOHDQG-HZ"¶´S(YLGHQWly, the shift towards empirical 
  
CRISIS OF RELEVANCE 9 
PHWKRGVZDVVRSURIRXQGWKDWLWLVWRGD\WDNHQIRUJUDQWHG&DQWULO¶VFRQFHUQVZHUHPRUH
methodologically relevant to today, and critically hinged on the relevance of research to 
HYHU\GD\OLIH³7KHFKRLFHOLHVEHWZHHn thorough studies on authentic problems, conducted with 
the best techniques that can be devised, and controlled laboratory experiments on problems 
ZKLFKKDYHQRUHODWLRQWROLIHLWVHOI´S 
After a couple of confident decades in research, producing many now-classic laboratory 
experiments, the crisis that Cantril anticipated came to life again. Elms (1975) reviewed over a 
dozen writings, mounting up over the previous decade, that proclaimed a ³FULVLVVWDJH´LQVRFLDO
psychology--a term Elms attributed to Berkowitz (p. 967), one which also resonated with the 
ODUJHU¶V]HLWJHLVW of social and economic crises in Western society at large (Faye, 2012). 
(OPVSXWWKHNH\LVVXHVXQGHUWKUHHKHDGLQJV³5HVHDUFKGLIILFXOWLHV´UHIHUUHGWRHYLGHQFHDQG
interpretation issues of the kind we have already seen: generalizability, reproducibility, potential 
FRQIRXQGVLQUHVHDUFK³5HVHDUFKHUH[SHFWDQFLHV´UHIHUUHGWRWKHXQUHDOLVWLFH[SHFWDWLRQWKDW
social psychology can be tackled with simple theories and paradigms.  Finally, relevance appears 
XQGHUWKHWKLUGKHDGLQJ³RXWVLGHSUHVVXUHV´LQFOXGLQJSUHVVXUHWRDSSO\NQRZOHGJHWRVRFLDO
problems, coming from the many movements for ethnic, gender, sexual, and colonial liberation 
WKDWIORXULVKHGLQWKH¶V³2XWVLGHSUHVVXUHV´DOVRLQFOXGHGFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHWUHDWPHQWRI
research participants, and a concern that relevance, in the shape of applied research, had become 
too important in the face of Federal cuts to research on basic questions in the United States.  
(OPV¶DUWLFOHDQGother literature of the period, suggests a scheme for subdividing 
relevance concerns.  
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x Question relevance is a concern about the limited applicability of theories and 
associated methods to social and human problems. For example, the worry often arises 
that basic lab research cannot easily be reproduced under messier field conditions, or is 
not amenable to crafting effective interventions.  
 
x Sample relevance is a concern about the limited generalizability from findings based 
on research samples to other human populations. Most often, this involves the recurring 
concern that research has overused samples of convenience, which can give a 
culturally, educationally, and demographically skewed picture of psychology. Social 
psychology is particularly vulnerable to sample relevance concerns, because it deals 
with culturally and socially influenced topics such as attitudes, prejudice and politics.   
 
x Communication relevance is a concern that we are not letting laypeople know about 
psychological research enough, or in the right way. For example, one might worry that 
our research is often written in jargon, that it is not represented when pundits are called 
upon, or that it is misrepresented and oversimplified if it does reach the public. 
 
In the following sections I will describe the history and present status of appeals to each 
relevance concern. In particular, I hope to show that influential voices in social psychology have 
pointed out deficiencies in each standard of relevance up to the present day.  
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Question relevance 
Question relevance has been at the heart of struggles about how to define the field of 
psychological research. ,QPRVWVFLHQFHV³EDVLF´DQG³applied´UHVHDUFK are differentiated from 
each other in methodological priorities (lab vs. field setting; conceptual vs. ecological validity) 
and in purpose (to create widely applicable theories vs. to solve a specific problem; Hoffman & 
Deffenbacher, 1993). By some accounts, North American psychology had turned toward valuing 
basic research and away from application in the early 20th century, when Titchener and Boring 
took WKHKHOPRIWKH$PHULFDQ3V\FKRORJLFDO$VVRFLDWLRQ2¶'RQQHOO 
More broadly, post-World War II developments in the Western world saw strong 
governmental investments in basic science for a variety of reasons, including support for 
democratic and enlightened values, and the need to anticipate world-changing technological 
development at the basic science level (Pielke, 2012). But the decades since then have seen 
challenges to basic science from both the political left and right.  Seeking fundamental insights 
has been criticized as irrelevant, both to pressing social problems and to the pragmatic use of 
public funds. ,QWKH¶Vin particular, psychology saw many calls for greater development of 
ecologically valid and applicable methods. While some contributors to the dialogue defended 
basic theory development (e.g. Smith, 1973), others called for the experiment to be seen as a 
specific context that may not generalize, rather than a default basis for knowledge (e.g., 
Silverman, 1971; Sherif, 1970). Helmreich (1975) called applied social psychology an 
³XQIXOILOOHGSURPLVH´SRLQWLQJRXWWKDWLQWKHWKHQ-new Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
most articles were lab experiments. While they were possibly relevant to applied issues, these 
VWXGLHVLQ+HOPUHLFK¶VYLHZGLGQRWshow the kind of external validity that might come from 
field settings or tests of applications.  
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Another critical trend around the same time, mostly among European psychologists, 
questioned the epistemic positivism, mechanism, and individualism underpinning the laboratory 
experiment. These critics offered more radical solutions to question relevance (see Parker, 1989, 
for a review, as well as Rijsman & Stroebe, 1989 and other papers in that issue of the European 
Journal of Social Psychology). For example, some argued for abandoning nomothetic aims, in 
favour of a more idiographic social psychology based on methods used in history (Gergen, 
1973). Some drew on theory and methodology from linguistics, arguing for more sensitivity to 
the intentions and context of the persons studied (Harré & Secord, 1972). Others promoted a 
focus on interactions rather than individual processes in explaining social phenomena 
(Moscovici, 1972). These insights gave rise to a parallel school of critical social psychology that 
has intersected with positivistic social psychology mainly in European publishing and academic 
circles, and even then, it has to be said, without a great deal of mutual understanding. 
In the post-crisis environment, voices from the non-Western world were also heard, 
working out how their perspectives might fit into the disagreement between American and 
European social psychologies. Moghaddam (1987) identified a more sensitive approach to 
cultural issues and a greater need for economic and social relevance as potential features of a 
³7KLUG:RUOG´SV\FKRORJ\6RXWK$IULFDSUHVHQWHGDQH[DPSOHLQWKH¶VDQG¶VRID
FRXQWU\XQGHUJRLQJSROLWLFDOXSKHDYDOZKHUH³UHOHYDQFH´KDGEHHQDQHDU-constant watchword 
among psychologists (de la Rey & Ipser, 2004). Long and Foster (2013), through analysis of 
South African professional addresses, showed how the political tone of calls for relevance 
changed from supporting the anti-apartheid struggle to adjusting to the new realities of a 
majority-rule market society. This well-WDNHQDQDO\VLVUHPLQGVXVWKDW³UHOHYDQFH´RIUHVHDUFK
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questions is in itself a morally and politically ambiguous topic. It can as easily be attained by 
giving advice to the exploiter, as by giving succour to the exploited.  
Historians and sociologists of 20th century science have described basic-applied relations as 
potentially following two models: one-way influence, in which basic science provides ideas for a 
wide range of applications, or two-way influence, in which insights from application additionally 
feed back into and inform basic science (Godin, 2006; Roll-Hansen, 2017; see also Medin, 
2012,QVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\/HZLQ¶VYLVLRQRIa program of action research, with 
mutually influencing theoretical and applied strands, is an often-cited example of the two-way 
ideal. However, the reality of status relations in psychology tends to be more one-way. Basic 
UHVHDUFKJDLQVPRUHUHVSHFWDQGDWWHQWLRQLQWKHILHOGDWODUJHEHFDXVHLWLV³XSVWUHDP´
influencing applications and behavioural technology, but without a reciprocal requirement for 
basic researchers to stay aware of where and how their ideas are being used. Social psychology 
researchers may recognize the negotiation of the basic-applied boundary revealed in the 
interviews of Calvert (2006) with physicists and biologists. Among themselves, these scientists 
valued basic research most highly, but saw a need to present it with an applied spin to funders.  
Prioritizing basic research in social psychology can happen even though applied work is 
frequently done, and even though it leads to important developments in practice (for example, in 
eyewitness identification, Wells, Memon & Penrod, 2006; for a more general overview, see 
Maton, 2017). Indeed, it is not my intention to downplay the actual importance and recognition 
of applied research. But we also should not underestimate a fundamental asymmetry in prestige. 
The friction between a de facto one-way model and an ideal Lewinian two-way model in social 
psychology regularly leads to public expressions of concern, from society presidents and other 
influential figures, about the low prestige of application in psychology (e.g., Buschini, Guimond, 
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& Breakwell, 2011; Gergen, 1973; Leary, 2015; Medin, 2012; Pettigrew, 2018). But these are 
seldom backed up by calls to change the structure of the one-way flow.  
Consider one article reporting an address by the then-president of the Society for 
Personality and Social Psychology (Snyder, 1993). Snyder gives examples from lab and field 
work with colleagues, showing how social psychology, by developing theory based on specific 
motivations, can improve the recruitment and retention of volunteers. He cites Lewin and argues 
that this research is an example of ideas flowing between basic and applied settings. The model 
of volunteerism thus developed was certainly highly useful and translatable to other applied 
domains where people go out of their way to help others.   Indeed, the basic element, drawn from 
motivational and self psychology, is easy to trace into practice.  
But it is harder to see from this account how the applied phase informed the basic theory 
underlying the research. Reading between the lines, some of the dimensions in the model were 
initially derived from open-ended interviews as well as existing psychological ideas, so that mid-
level theory at least took some inspiration from the field setting. However, 6Q\GHU¶V address does 
not make clear how the insights from practice have fed back to basic work on the multiple 
theories that convergently helped Snyder and colleagues to understand volunteering. This 
example is but one indication of the greater prestige of theory: even praise and recognition given 
to applied work often takes place following the one-way rather than the two-way model.  
Another indication is the frequent selective TXRWDWLRQLQSV\FKRORJ\RI.XUW/HZLQ¶V
³7KHUHLVQRWKLQJVRSUDFWLFDODVDJRRGWKHRU\´$V&UDLJQRWHVWKHquotation is 
often used ³DVDKDQG\GHYLFHIRUDVVHUWLQJWKDWDFDGHPLFtheory has practical importance in the 
ZRUOGZKLOHDYRLGLQJDQ\FDUHIXODQDO\VLV>@´SBillig (2015) likewise notes that many 
textbooks use the phrase to show that social psychology is self-evidently relevant to the applied 
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world, rather than to open discussion of whether and how it is relevant as practiced. Few uses of 
this quotation, however, have gone on to mention the return path that Lewin specified in the 
same article, by which there is also nothing so theoretical as a good practice (with some 
exceptions, mostly from applied psychology: e.g., Labonte, Feather, & Hills, 1999;  Lévy-
Leboyer, 1988; Meyer, 1991). 
In mainstream North American social psychology, the goal of relevance has been defined 
mainly as wider application, rather than adopting the more contextualized methods demanded by 
European critical responses. Specifically, the mid-¶VVDZDVXUJHRILQWHUHVWLQUHVHDUFKthat 
ZDV³WUDQVODWLRQDO´GHILQHGDVdirectly concerning outreach and interventions, in response to US 
funding agency shifts in priorities (Markus, 2004a; Major, 2006). In Europe, the applied, policy-
driven focus of the (XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VFramework Programmes had for some time provided 
incentives for researchers to follow translational goals (e.g., European Commission, 2002), while 
individual national bodies varied in their relative weightings of basic and applied research. 
In this discourse, some viewpoints RQSV\FKRORJ\¶VDSSOLHGSRWHQWLDOhave been sanguine, 
with Breckler (2006a) declaring that psychology was already translational, even while observing 
in the same journal and year that applied research suffered from diminished prestige in some 
eyes (Breckler, 2006b). Tashiro and Mortensen (2006) were more critical, in particular of social 
psychology. They showed in detail how methodological habits of basic research (e.g., its reliance 
on short- versus long-term intervention and single-session measurement) had reduced its 
credibility among applied researchers, while these habits applied as standards for evaluating 
research had likewise reduced the perceived prestige of applied research among basic 
researchers, and they urged HDFKVLGHWREHQGDOLWWOHWRZDUGWKHRWKHULQD³WUDQVODWLRQDO´spirit. 
Major (2006) also noted that the kind of methods and samples privileged in basic social 
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psychology have been ill-suited to impressing funders of translational research.  Others during 
this time voiced concerns that social psychology had moved away from measuring real 
behaviour (Baumeister, Vohs & Funder, 2007), taking aim both at explicit self-reports and 
implicit reaction-time measures, and arguing that concrete behavioural outcomes are more valid 
and convincing to an external audience.  
More recent addresses and editorials show that issues of question relevance are as alive as 
they ever were -- but also that their solutions seem to be as far away from the mainstream as 
ever. In a meeting on applying behavioural science to public policy (Keller-Allen & Li, 2013), 
the behavioural economist 7KDOHURSLQHGWKDW³>F@XUUHQWO\WKHW\SHRISV\FKRORJLFDOUHVHDUFKWKDW
is useful in the real world is not the type that is valued in the academic profession of psychology 
RULQWRSMRXUQDOV´(p. 45). The psychologist Kahneman agUHHGDGGLQJ³>W@KHQDQGQRZDSSOLHG
SV\FKRORJ\LVQRWDWWUDFWLQJWKHEHVWWDOHQWRUKHOGLQKLJKUHJDUGDWWKHEHVWXQLYHUVLWLHV´S46). 
It is possible to take a more optimistic view of the applicability of social psychology, especially 
by comparison to other social sciences. But enough important voices continue to draw attention 
to the reputational disadvantage of applied research that these concerns should be looked at 
seriously. 
Sample relevance 
Relying on samples of undergraduate students, while presuming generalizability to broader 
populations, was a habit of social psychological research that began to look EDGLQWKH¶V
Because undergraduate populations in the USA and elsewhere were explicitly or de facto 
segregated by class, gender and race, the practice underrepresented the categories of people who 
were claiming the right to be heard in those days. More generally, it skewed psychology towards 
conclusions that might not apply to older, less affluent, or less educated populations, let alone 
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people outside the Euro-American world. Sample relevance was mentioned by various authors in 
WKHFULVLVOLWHUDWXUHRIWKH¶VDQG¶V, including Elms (1975) and Sherif (1977), but often 
tangentially. Strong concern over sample relevance was redoubled in WKH¶VZLWKWZR
critical salvoes in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: first from Carlson (1984), 
who also criticized the relevance of lab research settings, and then from Sears (1986), who 
IRFXVHGRQVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQXQGHUJUDGXDWHVGRFXPHQWLQJERWKWKHSUHYDOHQFH
of the practice and its likely drawbacks. In general, sample relevance can be seen as more of a 
FRQFHUQWKHOHVV³EDVLF´WKHSV\Fhological processes in play, and the more socially and culturally 
influenced they are. 
Does sample relevance make a difference? Reviewing meta-analyses of consumer research 
that could compare student and representative samples, Peterson (2001) noted that in 19% of 
cases one sample yielded an effect in the opposite direction than the other. In an additional 32% 
RIFDVHVUHVXOWVZHUHLQWKHVDPHGLUHFWLRQEXWRQHVDPSOH¶VHIIHFWVL]HZDVWZLFHRUPRUHWKDW
of the other (with student samples, in general, being less variable and yielding larger effects). 
Weiner, Kraus and Lieberman (2011) offer similar cautions on the basis of a number of 
systematic comparisons of mock juries composed of students versus community members. 
However, other scholars have argued that limitations of student-based research are minimal; for 
example, Druckman and Kam (2011) propose that failures to generalize can be overcome by 
identifying relevant variables on which student and other populations differ and including those 
variables as moderators or covariates in a common model.  
The typical research sample in social psychology has changed VLQFHWKH¶V7KH¶V 
have seen the rise of crowdsourced participants as a widely accepted alternative to the 
undergraduate sample of convenience -- mainly workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), 
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although new data sources are being developed, such as Prolific Academic and Crowdflower 
(Peer, Samat, Brandimarte & Acquisti, 2017). Indeed, in major social/personality psychology 
journals, online samples have gone from being extremely rare in 2005 to comprising nearly 50% 
of study samples in 2015 (Anderson, Allen et al., 2018). By comparison, in a more systematic 
look at two journals in the pre-$07HUD\HDUVDIWHU6HDUV¶FULWLTXH:LWWHand Brandt (2008) 
showed that 87.5% of studies in JPSP, and 92.6% of studies in the European Journal of Social 
Psychology (EJSP), sampled student participants. Today, the monoculture of undergraduates 
decried by Sears has been replaced by a duo-culture of undergraduates and crowdsourced 
workers. If this is an improvement over the mainly-students landscape of research participation, 
it is still a long way from a truly diverse selection of research samples. 
Have online samples solved our sample relevance problems? Initial validation studies gave 
positive reYLHZVIRU$07ZRUNHUV¶GDWDThese participants seemed accurate, attentive, and more 
diverse in age, gender and career than typical psychology students (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 
2012, Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Iperiotis, 2010). Also, 
Coppock (2018) and Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman and Freese (2015) have separately shown that 
AMT samples give very similar results to nationally representative samples in survey 
experiments drawing on political and social psychology for their hypotheses.  
However, doubts have also emerged. The active population of AMT workers doing studies 
at any one time turns out to be only 7,300 or so (Stewart, Ungemach, et al., 2015), adding to 
concerns that worker data may be µtoo good¶--i.e., invalid--because of non-naïveté about the 
tasks and theories involved. Workers are familiar with common paradigms and frequently 
discuss experiments amongst themselves (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). Making use of 
less intensively used platforms may reduce this concern (Peer et al., 2017), but then again, 
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naïveté is likely to reduce as more researchers use them. Lack of laboratory control over online 
participants also raises problems with some paradigms. For example, post-manipulation drop-
outs can seriously bias conclusions if one condition seems more difficult than another to 
participants (Zhou & Fishbach, 2016). Online studies also are limited in ability to create an 
absorbing lab environment, especially in social psychology, whose key procedures often include 
personal interaction. Methodological limitations of online studies have likely affected the kind of 
research that is published in other, not necessarily positive ways (Anderson et al., 2018). 
Additionally, renewed attention has focused on the cultural limitations of samples of 
convenience. Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) coined the memorable acronym WEIRD 
(Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) to describe the socio-cultural background 
of most participants in psychological studies. While such samples are conveniently close at hand 
for researchers who are themselves WEIRD, Henrich and colleagues argued that they do not 
represent the life of most human beings -- now or ever -- and lead to skewed assumptions about 
human nature, even more so if the participant population is drawn primarily from specific groups 
(e.g., USA nationals) and social strata. Given that AMT workers from the USA are more 
educated and liberal-leaning than the population at large (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), this 
source of data looks to provide no respite from the WEIRDness of convenience sampling. An 
increasingly common solution is to take advantage of the strong representation of Indian as well 
as US workers in Mechanical Turk and conduct cross-cultural research comparing the two 
nationalities (e.g. Eriksson, Coultas & de Barra, 2016; Nishi, Christakis, & Reed, 2016). But the 
representativeness of Indian crowdsourced workers within their own culture has not yet been 
studied comprehensively, and again, this solution only replaces a monoculture with, as it were, a 
two-culture culture. 
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Ultimately, whatever the actual validity of the convenience sample, its use also poses a 
problem of public relations for the discipline. ReturninJWR0DMRU¶VDUJXPHQWDVFLHQFH
based on undergraduates (or hard-driven semi-professional research participants) is vulnerable to 
criticism from observers, who might well wonder whether any new finding will generalize to 
their special population of interest. Even if most findings do generalize, some will not. A science 
that can point to general-population and cross-cultural replications of its major findings is one 
that will have an easier time making its case to others. 
Finally, social psychologists are only recently awakening to the possibility that not just our 
participants, but our stimuli and measures, might be non-representativeHFKRLQJ&DUOVRQ¶V
(1984) joint critique of samples and methods. Statistical solutions, such as treating stimulus 
characteristics as random variables, provide one way to test generalizability but will usually 
require an increase in participant numbers and/or study length to make up for lost statistical 
power (Judd, Westfall & Kenny, 2012). Method relevance concerns are also sometimes 
awakened by a ³paradigm PRQRFXOWXUH´in which one arbitrary or artificial-seeming scenario 
comes into vogue to the exclusion of more realistic alternatives, such as the trolley dilemma 
vignette in moral psychology (Bauman, McGraw & Bartels, 2014). 
Communication relevance 
 ,QWKH¶VFULVLVDQRWKHUZRUU\ZDVWKDWVRFLDOSV\FKRORJLVWVKDGLVRODWHGWKHPVHOYHV
from reality, expressing themselves in language not easily understood by non-specialists. Miller 
(1969), in addressing the American Psychological Association, coined the durable phrase, 
³JLYLQJSV\FKRORJ\DZD\´HFKRHGLQWKHWLWOHVRIVFRUHVRIERRNVDQGDUWLFOHVVLQFHWKHQ
0LOOHU¶VDGGUHVVDUJXHGWKDWPRUHSV\FKRORJLVWVQHHGHGWRWDNHRQWKHMRERIWHOOLQJILQGLQJVWR
the public rather than to fellow scholars.  Re-UHDGLQJ0LOOHU¶VDGGUHVVLVZRUWKZKLOHWRGD\
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because it highlights a more radical message often lost in the rote repetition of his signal phrase: 
that, ethically, politically and pragmatically, people outside academia are the best placed to apply 
psychological insights. Following this observation, he argued that psychologists should focus on 
communicating well-supported principles to that audience, rather than trying to craft 
interventions themselves.    
An emphasis on communication also informed the immediately subsequent literature on 




VKDUSORRNDWWKH³PHWD-SV\FKRORJLHV´RUSKLORVRSKLFDOPHVVDJHVRIsuch theoretical stances as 
behaviourism and humanistic psychology, with the conclusion that a meta-psychology that sends 
an arrogant, controlling message to the public would be neither popular nor desirable. 
Communication, to these writers, offered a way to influence the public that would be more 
gentle, humanistic, and democratic than the human engineering envisioned by behaviourists and 
some social psychologists themselves. 
Communication relevance today might be seen as a resolved concern, because social and 
personality psychology has been in the public eye over the past decades as never before. 
*ODGZHOO¶VSRSXODUERRNVRQEHKDYLRXUDOUHVHDUFKWKHPVHOYHVUHSUHVHQWD³WLSSLQJSRLQW´
(Gladwell, 2000) opening a flood of interest in social psychology findings, through media both 
conventional and new (e.g., TED talks, online articles at such outlets as Vox.com and 
Slate.com). Academic social and cognitive psychologists have also taken to writing popular trade 
books on their own research and expertise. Looking at the Amazon.co.uk top 100 best sellers in 
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³3V\FKRORJ\DQG3V\FKLDWU\´DWWKHWLPHRIfirst writing (30 March, 2017), one finds such 
familiar names as Kahneman (#8), Dweck (#19), Cialdini (#40), and Feldman Barrett (#97), 
DORQJVLGH*ODGZHOO¶VRZQOutliers 1RWDEO\WKHFRQFHSWRI³LPSOLFLWELDV´GHYHORSHGLQ
social psychology was mentioned by Hillary Clinton during the 2016 US Presidential debates, 
and continued to draw attention in the 2018 response of the Starbucks coffee chain to a racial 
bias incident involving its employees.  
Nonetheless, even with a good amount of communication, there comes the risk of 
miscommunication. As much as social psychologists have been able to control the message by 
being their own authors and spokespeople, they often still have to communicate via journalists, 
popular press authors and university press releases. This can lead to inflated claims, wrong 
claims, and oversimplification, which in turn discourages any further search for communication 
relevance (Gernsbacher, 2006). Often, too, social psychology research is rebranded ³7KH
%HKDYLRXUDO,QVLJKWV7HDPLVZLGHO\SHUFHLYHGDVGRLQJEHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFV´VD\V'DQLHO
.DKQHPDQ³7KH\DUHDctually doing social psychology´ -- Harford, 2014), so that findings are 
communicated to the public without being linked to our discipline, leaving people in the dark 
about what we do.  Finally, the message may not be getting out as much as we would like; 
Lilienfeld (2012) cites the perception that psychology research is not useful as an overarching 
reason why the public doubts SV\FKRORJ\¶VVWDWXVDVDVFLHQFH 
Not only the media are to blame. Social psychologists with very different opinions on the 
crisis of evidence have voiced concerns about publishing attention-grabbing, media-friendly 
UHVHDUFKZLWKVXUSULVLQJRU³VH[\´UHVXOWV -- UHFDSLWXODWLQJ5LQJ¶VFRQFHUQVDERXW³µIXQ-
and-JDPHV¶VRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\´DWWKHRQVHWRIWKHSUHYLRXVFULVLVSome define the fault of these 
studies as abandoning rigorous methodology (e.g., Asendorpf, Conner et al., 2013), others as 
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abandoning rigorous theorizing (e.g., Ellemers, 2013; Schaller, 2016). However, it is possible to 
agree with both points at once.  
Against this background, one might wonder whether calling for more communication 
might be premature, until we can agree on things like standards of evidence and replicability. 
One concern is that early reporting of results might later be negated by evidence produced under 
improving standards of knowledge, leaving the public confused. For example, research into the 
psychological effects of assuming a confident bodily posture (Carney, Cuddy & Yap, 2015) 
looked like a role model for public engagement earlier in the decade. Social psychologist Amy 
Cuddy became a widely known public-facing star of the field through TED talks and network 
television appearances. But when a larger, independent study failed to replicate some of these 
effects on risk-taking and hormones (Ranehill, Dreber et al., 2015), and a key member of the lab 
stated her own lack of belief in these effects (Carney, 2016), media accounts called the whole 
enterprise into question (e.g., Peters, 2016). It seems that debunking narratives sell just as well as 
surprising effects, even though Ranehill et al. (2015) and further replication efforts (Cesario, 
Jonas, & Carney, 2017) have replicated the basic effect of posing upon feelings of power, if not 
downstream outcomes. The loser from this portrait of instability, perhaps, is the public image of 
social psychology as a whole. 
 Because of the perennial nature of exhortations to communicate, it is particularly 
important to look at some widely-spread views of what holds back communication. In 2014, the 
American Psychological Association (APA) president commissioned a Presidential Task Force 
to address the lack of public outreach and understanding about scientific psychology. As reported 
in the APA Monitor (Kaslow, 2014), initial feedback from this task force answered the question 
³:KDWVWRSVXV"´IURPFRPPXQLFDWLQJZLWKWKLVH[SODQDWLRQ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Countless barriers make it challenging for us to communicate our science. 
They include attitudinal barriers, such as the disconnect between scientists 
and practitioners and the view of some psychologists that translation and 
advocacy are not part of the role of the scientist or scientist-practitioner. There 
are also barriers related to the public's ability to understand science and 
mental health issues, as well as with psychologists' ability to communicate in 
ways that can be understood by non-psychologists. Many psychologists lack 
experience and comfort with communicating to the public or lack the 
academic institutional support to do so. (p. 5) 
 
A similar, if more specific, analysis was offered at the 2016 conference of the Society for 
3HUVRQDOLW\DQG6RFLDO3V\FKRORJ\LQDV\PSRVLXPWDONWLWOHG³7DONLQJWRKXPDQV,VLWDJRRG
LGHD"´*LOEHUW7RVXPPDUL]HWKLVWDONLVWRORVHDOORIWKHH[XEHUDQWZit with which 
Gilbert expressed his views, but the essence of his argument was that sFLHQWLVWVGRQ¶W
communicate with lay people because they are afraid of two things. First, they fear that other 
scientists will scorn them for watering down their message. Second, they fear that in 
communicating simplified or preliminary findings, they will commit a crime against the truth. 
Gilbert urges us nevertheless to go ahead and communicate what we know, because our work is 
important, the world is necessarily imperfect, and the process of communicating can help 
psychologists figure out for ourselves what is most important. For now, it is enough to note that 
both these US-based analyses decry an apparent communication gap in scientific psychology, 
and focus on the indivLGXDOUHVHDUFKHU¶VDWWLWXGHDQGDELOLW\DVFXOSULWV 
It is also interesting to note that recent Presidential addresses of the British Psychological 
Society (BPS) take a much more positive approach to engagement, reviewing communication 
success stories rather than exhorting people to engage (Hacker Hughes, 2016; Kinderman, 2017).  
7KLVPD\EHGXHWRWKH%36¶JUHDWHUVWUXFWXUDOHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHPHGLDDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQ, 
relative to comparable US organizations. Attention to incentives seems to produce, and flow 
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from, an approach to improving communication that is systemic rather than focused on 
individual fears, individual attitudes, or individual lack of ability.1 
 
Incentives and relevance 
 
We have seen that changing practices in research evidence standards are largely driven by 
career incentives, and in particular the increased willingness of journals in social psychology to 
give credit for replications, fully reported research, nonsignificant findings, and other 
innovations that overall tend to improve the quality of our evidence base. When it comes to 
relevance, then, a larger gamut of incentives needs to be looked at. In this next section I review 
the existing incentives that work both for and against greater adoption of the three standards of 
relevance, and offer suggestions for those who wish to promote relevance effectively. 
 
Incentives for question relevance 
There is no question that a great deal of highly useful applied psychology work has been 
carried out in recent decades, both in psychology departments and in allied disciplines such as 
communication and marketing. Still, as shown previously, there is a perception that applied work 
is not respected as highly as basic research, when careers in social psychology are evaluated in 
hiring and institutional assessment.  
The objective basis for this disparity is hard to find. Metrics such as the Impact Factor of 
journals give only equivocal evidence for it. In the Thompson Reuters Journal Citation Reports 
(2017WKHFDWHJRU\³3V\FKRORJ\$SSOLHG´KDVDQDJJUHJDWH,PSDFW)DFWRURI2.27, compared to 
                                               
1  I should mention that in a longer article based on her presidential address, Kaslow (2015) does 
mention, if briefly, the need to actively reward communication and remove disincentives.  
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2.08 IRU³3V\FKRORJ\6RFLDO´ In the Social category, moreover, many journals appear that could 
reasonably be classed as applied. While not as impactful as the flagship JPSP (5.73), the ratings 
of Journal of Health and Social Behaviour (2.62) and Law and Human Behaviour (2.87) are 
respectable enough compared to their basic social counterparts, while in the Applied category 
proper, Journal of Applied Psychology (4.64), Journal of Management (8.08) and Personnel 
Psychology (5.52) more than hold their own. 
 It may be that the reputation of a research publication, and by extension its field, depends 
not just on how many citations it gets, but who is citing it -- WKH³GLUHFWLRQRIJD]H´RIDILHOGDV
measured by more specific citation patterns. High-ranking applied journals might not be seen as 
prototypical social psychology, because their authors and readers overlap with fields such as 
management and organizational psychology. To compare JPSP to Journal of Applied Psychology 
(JAP), while both score high in impact, from 2008-2017 JAP has cited JPSP 337 times, while 
JPSP has only cited JAP 41 times. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin cites JAP 38 
times during this period, and is cited by JAP 75 times, although its impact factor (2.50) is much 
lower than that of JAP (4.64). Where, then, does JAP¶VLPSDFWUDWLQJFRPHIURP"7KDWMRXUQDO¶V
top ten sources of incoming citations are all journals in management, organizational psychology 
and business. Much of its knowledge is exported outside psychology altogether. 
If basic psychology does not look well on applied psychology, then, it may be because 
basic psychology does not look upon it at all ± the one-way model put into practice in the flow of 
citations. More generally, the true impact of applied psychology on the field as a whole can 
never be adequately measured by its merely scholarly impact, because its findings are taken up 
by users who do not leave a scholarly record. Instead, they communicate by newsletter articles, 
training manuals, evaluation documents, and even more ephemeral means. This may all seem 
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like a natural consequence of the one-way flow of knowledge, from theory to basic research to 
applied research to practice. But there is nothing necessary about valuing upstream over 
downstream locations in this ecology. Lewin, as already mentioned, wanted theory to learn and 
take validation from application just as much as the other way around.  
Imagine a parallel universe where Titchener and Boring were hit by a horseless carriage 
circa 1915, so that the APA missed the sharp turn to experimentalism. Career expectations might 
then require that after validating a basic effect in the lab, some real-world application be tested. 
But in our universe, the kind of follow-up research urged on scholars is usually to elaborate and 
refine the evidence for the theory behind the effect. The privilege of theory is upheld by 
SXEOLFDWLRQVWDQGDUGVWKDWUHTXLUHHYLGHQFHRIH[DFWFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPV³SURFHVV´YDULDEOHVRU
moderating effects as necessary elements of research development. These are all elements more 
readily tested in the lab than in field settings, ZKHUHFRQGLWLRQVDUHPHVV\DQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
patience to fill out additional measures is limited.  
While it is true that ILHOGVWXGLHVDUHQRWFDWHJRULFDOO\EDUUHGIURPSXEOLFDWLRQLQ³WKHmajor 
social psychological journals,´HYLGHQFHVWDQGDUGVDWWKRVHMRXUQDOVPHDQWKH\RIWHQKDYHWREH
packaged with a cohort of lab studies (e.g., Webber et al., 2018; Goff, Jackson, Di Leone, 
Culotta, & DiTomasso, 2014), whereas there is no reciprocal requirement for mostly lab-based 
studies to take to the field. While the call of McGuire (2009) to test basic theoretical questions in 
field settings is appealing, the added difficulty and expense of field research already weigh 
against this move, not to mention the risk that a field setting would be seen as lacking some 
crucial element of sophistication or control. 
 Standards of novelty and autonomy in publishing and career evaluation also undercut 
relevance. We award kudos to someone who has established a fresh theoretical idea, and the 
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acclaim for such innovation does not require proof of concept in the field. Lower marks go to 
someone who merely tries to reproduce RWKHUSHRSOH¶VILndings (Neuliep & Crandall, 1990, 
1993). Under the one-way flow of ideas from basic to applied realms, applied research is cast in 
the role of conceptually replicating basic research. Seldom is basic research required to validate 
itself by building on systematic observations from the field.   
 Moreover, a practitioner seeking to adopt an effective intervention usually wants one that 
draws on various theories to have the best chance of success, rather than promoting a single 
view. The work on volunteering described by Snyder (1993), for example, drew on incentive 
theory, as well as a variety of self- and social-oriented motivational theories. These features work 
against the tacit requirement that research should be novel, causally pure, and represent an 
autonomous contribution. So, even if we could get basic research out into the field, practitioners 
may baulk when career incentives push the researchers into insisting that only their own, recent 
work be included as the basis for an intervention.  
 Add to all these disincentives the greater difficulty and expense of doing relevant 
research in the field, and it becomes obvious why there is a constant unresolved worry about 
VRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\¶VUHOHYDQFH%XWRQDmore positive note, applied research questions and 
methods already have many incentives in their corner. Organizations such as the Society for the 
Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) at the research end, and the Behavioural Science 
Policy Association (BSPA) at the translation end, are dedicated to publishing, promoting, and 
rewarding relevant research topics and outreach to policymakers. Importantly, the recently 
founded SPARQ center at Stanford University (https://sparq.stanford.edu ; Conner, March 2014) 
not only directly enlists leading social psychologists to communicate directly with practitioners 
on issues of public relevance, but emphasizes the reciprocal experience of social psychologists 
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learning from practitioners what would be useful research to do, in a true application of the 
Lewinian model. Public funding is constantly under pressure to show results, and the recurring 
sense of a relevance crisis in the USA coincides with times when the federal government 
GLUHFWHGUHVRXUFHVDZD\IURPEDVLFUHVHDUFKLQWKH¶V%ULPHWDO 1969) and 40 years later. 
The effect of the scientific nihilism shown by the Trump administration to date is yet to play out 
fully, but it may well make an even stronger case for increasing the relevance of our research in 
the eyes of the public, rather than retreating into basic questions.  
In the United Kingdom, the funding councils have made a major effort in the past ten years to 
LQFUHDVHUHOHYDQFHXQGHUWKHUXEULFRI³LPSDFW´6XFFHVVIXOJUDQWVQRZQHHGWRPDNHa statement 
about the relevance of the proposed research, whether it be application outreach, or the 
communication of findings from basic research. Career evaluation in the UK also increasingly 
GHSHQGVRQRQH¶VDELOLW\WRPDNHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQORRNJRRGLQWKHSHULRGLFQDWLRQDOUHVHDUFK
assessment that determines distribution of funding to universities (currently, the Research 
Excellence Framework, or REF). As of 2013, the REF has included ³LPSDFWFDVHV´LQLWV
evaluation, with clear if quite stringent guidelines that reward research that was developed in 
academia and later proven to have been successfully applied outside that setting to change 
policy. Finally, over the past two decades or so, the massive FP6, FP7, and HORIZON 2020 
grant schemes funded by the European Union have all emphasized the outcomes and uses of 
research, usually requiring active collaboration with business or other end-users. 
Those who champion greater application of social psychology should, above all, work to 
remove barriers in publication and career evaluation. Few journal policies (including, admittedly, 
our own current policy at JESP) make clear how high-relevance tests of research can fit into 
criteria that explicitly stress internal validity and theoretical rigour. In a time when mediation, 
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moderation, or complex interactions are seen as tacit requirements, the more elegant designs 
typical of applied research require positive validation if they are to be encouraged. Those who sit 
on hiring, tenure, and promotion committees should consider how their standards might 
discourage a research approach that finds solutions driven by a problem, rather than creating the 
solution first and then looking for a problem.  
Those who are satisfied with a one-way flow of information from basic to applied research 
will have no need to call for increased question relevance. But, for those who are not, it is time to 
go beyond mHUHO\VD\LQJ³ZHVKRXOGVXSSRUWDSSOLHGUHVHDUFK more.´(IIHFWLYHFKDQJHPXVW
affirm, overtly, that theoretical sophistication and real-world relevance are parallel grounds for 
evaluation. To do more than merely pay lip-VHUYLFHWR/HZLQ¶VYLVLRQRIDUHFLSURFDOIORZRI
information, evaluators should reward those theories that seek out and incorporate insights from 
the field, and look for and reward explicit consideration of the reverse path from applied to basic 
research. If basic and applied research are indeed equal, then theory without relevance should be 
given as much critical scrutiny as relevance without theory. 
 
Incentives for sample relevance 
 
Most social psychologists would likely conduct their research using more representative 
samples, if they had unlimited budgets and help with recruitment. The incentive to use samples 
of convenience is above all economic. Undergraduates can work for free, as part of course 
requirements, and are readily available. Online participants also started out being paid rates well 
below the minimum wage in most Western countries, to the point where the typical left-liberal 
social psychologist (Duarte, Crawford, et al., 2015) risked being characterised in a modern-day 
DeYLO¶V'LFWLRQDU\DVVRPHRQHZKRdemands that McDonalds pay $15 an hour yet accepts an 
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AMT rate of payment of $3 an hour. Even if we heeded the call to pay a living wage to online 
workers (Williamson, 2016), the ease and speed of recruitment and the availability of a willing 
population make online worker pools easier to use than community samples.  With less and less 
funding available, and career evaluation demanding more and more studies in more and more 
publications, requiring more and more participants (thanks to the evidence crisis), something has 
to give. That something is usually sample relevance. 
Achieving sample relevance also can require additional effort: translating and back-
translating for cross-national studies, making sure items are valid for all cultural backgrounds 
and educational levels studied, bringing the lab to the people or the people to the lab. Adding 
insult to injury, researchers often find that non-standard populations become a marked category 
in the review process (Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013), raising issues that can jeopardise 
acceptance at highly selective outlets. For example, if you recruited a sample of noodle vendors 
in Thailand in order to study certain basic processes, you would risk a UHYLHZHUDVNLQJ³:K\GLG
\RXVWXG\7KDLQRRGOHYHQGRUV"´RU³&DQWKHVHUHVXOWVUHDOO\JHQHUDOL]HEH\RQGWKHQRRGOH
VWDQG"´-- TXHVWLRQVDOPRVWQHYHUDVNHGRI³QRUPDO´EXWDFWXDOO\:(,5'SDUWLFLSDQWSRSXODWLRQV
such as North American introductory psychology students. 
A few bright lights of incentive have lit the way toward more representative and diverse 
samples. Some journal editors have raised the issue in recent editorials; in particular, the recently 
appointed chief editor of JPSP¶V$WWLWXGes and Social Cognition section has spelled out concrete 
ZD\VWKDWUHSOLFDWLQJDQHIIHFWDFURVVVDPSOHVFDQQRZRSHQWKHGRRUWRSXEOLFDWLRQ³,IWKHVDPH
HIIHFWVRFFXULQDVDPSOHWKDWLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKHRULJLQDORQHWKLVZLOOFRQVWLWXWHDµELJ
SOXV¶WKDWFRXOGEULQJWKHSDSHU above the threshold for publication in JPSP: ASC. Likewise, 
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demonstrating that an effect does not generalize across samples for theory-guided reasons would 
DOVREHFRQVLGHUHGDVWUHQJWK´.LWD\DPDS 
Funding opportunities have also encouraged the use of more relevant samples. The best of 
these have explicitly funded research on large representative population cohorts, such as TESS 
(Time-sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences) a program funded by the US National 
Science Foundation and partnered with a large opinion research corporation. Since 2001, TESS 
has been taking competitive applications for one-shot experimental studies to be conducted on 
stratified panels of about 2,000 US residents, accepting about 24 a year, and taking on all 
responsibility and costs of data collection once the approved questionnaire has been submitted.  
In an increasingly competitive multidisciplinary funding environment, it seems rash for a 
social psychologist to endanger a grant proposal by reducing costs through the use of 
convenience samples. Compared to the costs of salaries and overheads, or the large sums spent 
on scanning time in neuroimaging research, allocating grant budget to recruiting representative 
samples should be seen as a worthwhile investment. Initiatives would be especially welcome for 
redirecting funds going to Amazon into non-profit research enterprises similar to TESS, ones that 
recruit and maintain quality participants NHHSLQJLQPLQGDUHVHDUFKHU¶VQHHGV  
 
Incentives for communication relevance 
 As with the other two relevance areas, career pressures within academia seem to 
discourage spending time on communication output to the public. Scholars are instead advised to 
focus their attention on journal articles, grants, and service activities such as journal reviewing or 
editing. A number of studies and commentaries have documented how mentors and peers in 
academia actively discourage public engagement (for a review, see Kaslow, 2015). How, then, is 
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there so much communication of social psychology in the media, if social psychologists are not 
supposed to be doing it?  
For one, there is a certain intrinsic publicity value to  media coverage. University 
administrations, in particular, see value in having media-star faculty and a flow of research news 
branded with the university name. To varying degrees, they encourage press releases, media 
contacts, and other forms of engagement; under the supervision of public information officers, 
these activities have increased at universities over the past decades (Dudo, 2015). Moreover, a 
large number of empirical studies across a variety of fields have found that scientists 
communicate with the media and public more often than might be assumed, that their 
interactions are largely enjoyable, and that much more often than not they leave with the 
impression that their findings were communicated accurately (Dudo, 2015). 
To ask the opposite question, then: if public communication can be pleasurable, why DUHQ¶W
more people doing it? One reason is that research communicated to the public has to meet some 
standard of question relevance. While a certain level of theoretical and methodological 
sophistication has become state-of-the art, even necessary, in order to publish in leading journals, 
such articles are not likely to engage the public. Structural equation models and complex 
interaction effects have great merit when addressing precise scientific questions. But papers 
focused on such findings, or on tests between abstract theories, are not really cut out for the 
public eye, and their authors are aware of this. 
Nonetheless, compared to cell biology or particle physics, social psychology deals much 
more with everyday concepts. Our research often proceeds from concrete ideas and insights with 
an immediate appeal ± for exampleZK\GRSHRSOHGLVDSSURYHRI³YLFWLPOHVV´FULPHV"And do 
people in power think differently than their subordinates do? Nor does research have to be 
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immediately applicable to social problems in order to be interesting. The public is often eager to 
validate, challenge or expand their own ideas about basic concepts like emotions, memory, 
FXOWXUHDQGSHUVRQDOLW\0LOOHU¶V(1969) ³JLYLQJSV\FKRORJ\DZD\´DGGUHVVproposed that 
influencing lay psychological beliefs could itself be a revolutionary act. Schwartz (1997) has 
argued that introducing ideas from psychological research into the wider culture itself is a kind 
RILQWHUYHQWLRQRU³LGHDWHFKQRORJ\´VKDSLQJH[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWZKDWLVSRVVLEOHLQDVHOI-
fulfilling way.  Moscovici¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHLQIOXHQFHHPDQDWLQJIURPWKHVRFLDO
representation of psychoanalytic concepts is one testimony to the power of such ideas. 
The problem may not lie so much in encouraging communication, as in understanding 
when it is and is not high-TXDOLW\$SUDFWLFHPD\EHFRPHGHYDOXHGEHFDXVHVFKRODUVGRQ¶W
know how to evaluate it, as has been observed with replication studies (Brandt, IJzerman et al., 
2014). If standards of evaluating media engagement are unclear, then media engagement risks 
being excluded entirely from consideration (e.g., when applying for jobs or promotion) out of a 
suspicion that credit for media engagement has accrued only for trivial, easy, inaccurate, or low-
quality efforts. And bad media coverage does exist in science. A recent study of health research 
communication identified most exaggerations in the media as traceable to overstated press 
releases (Sumner et al., 2014), while other research shows that press reports often fail to take 
research quality into account (Wang, Bolland, Gamble & Grey, 2015). Worse still, some 
academics and universities collude with industry and the press in preparing highly questionable 
³UHVHDUFK´UHOHDVHVRQVXFKWRSLFVDVWKHHTXDWLRQIRUDSHUIHFWFXSRIWHDHVSHFLDOO\LQWKH8.
(Goldacre, 2009). Bad apples of research communication tend to be generalized into a whole 
rotten orchard that junior researchers are warned away from entering. 
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Kaslow (2015) called IRUD³FXOWXUHVKLIW´LQSV\FKRORJ\ZKLFKZRXOGLQYROYHLQFUHDVHG
training and research into effective outreach. Most concretely, she suggests introducing more 
honours and awards for individuals and institutions who communicate well. Indeed, awards for 
media engagement are already given by (among others) the Society of Personality and Social 
Psychology, the Australian Psychological Society, and the BPS. And, returning to an earlier 
topic, applied research in the public interest is honoured with annual awards by the APA itself, 
by the Association for Psychological Science, and by the Society for the Psychological Study of 
Social Issues. 
While these competitive incentives have the desirable feature of being vetted for quality, 
arguably they do not go far enough to reward good-quality public communication as a normal, 
rather than exceptional, achievement in an academic career. Unlike the other facets of relevance, 
public communication does not have an easy means of evaluation, of the kind that peer review 
and journal prestige provide for published articles. Imposing a change by fiat on hundreds of job 
and advancement committees, and the advisors who prepare junior scholars to meet them, would 
be a difficult task at best. Institutions dedicated to systematic improvement of science 
communication can help: for example, the workshops and media events organized through The 
Alan Alda Center for Communicating Science, at Stony Brook University in New York. Another 
way forward would be to treat good-quality public communication as a normal and necessary 
requirement of public funding. The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in Britain 
have done so through their impact requirements for grant proposals, which can be achieved via 
policy influence, communication with professionals, or communication with the public.  
I can imagine a more ambitious project, still within the reach of a professional 
organization, that would help to validate good news engagement in the eyes of sceptical scholars. 
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/HW¶VLPDJLQHDZHEVLWHWKDWZRXOGEHVSRQVRUHGE\RQHRIRXUSURIHVVLRQDOVRcieties, called 
63,QVLJKWIRU³6RFLDO3V\FKRORJ\,QVLJKW.´3V\FKRORJLVWVZRXOGEHLQYLWHGWRVXEPLWOLQNVWR
general-interest news and magazine articles about their research to SPInsight, supplied with 
clerical support and a board of peer editors. The editors, with the help of specialist reviewers 
where needed, would rate each article on accuracy and evidence base, and select a subset of the 
best for linking on the site. Selection onto SPinsight would be available as a benchmark of 
service to the field for career evaluators to consider, and could plausibly substitute for other 
activities such as reviewing or society office-KROGLQJ:KDW¶VPRUH63,QVLJKWFRXOGDGGUHVV
concerns about communication by shifting its standards or creating special prestige sections--for 
example, giving special honours to articles that address broader issues than the findings of one 
lab, such as evidence from a meta-analysis, or findings that explain dissent within a field to the 
public in a measured and informative way. 
 
 
Links between relevance and evidence 
 
Relevance and evidence concerns do not just exist in parallel. We may very well need to 
address questions of relevance in order to move the evidence crisis past a number of impasses 
that have appeared over the past five years or so. That is, to solve some problems in the evidence 
crisis, we will have to make progress on relevance issues as well. Most broadly, seeing what we 
do as relevant to real-world outcomes can motivate bolder steps toward reproducible and solid 
research. Triviality is sometimes taken as a defence against accusations of poor practice, as in 
this interview with one psychologist whose media-friendly research on dancing had apparently 
overstated exploratory results: ³$V,VDLGZH¶UHSV\FKRORJLVWV´KHVDLG³:HKDYHQ¶WZURQJO\
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UHSRUWHGDFXUHIRUFDQFHURUDQ\WKLQJOLNHWKDW<RXNQRZLW¶VQRWWKDWLPSRUWDQWLVLWUHDOO\"´
(Engber, 2017).  
If we are to tell a better story about our research--especially to the ears of granting bodies--
this kind of excuse should be inadmissible. Taking on more important questions and using less 
controllable methods should naturally motivate more serious, less playful approaches to 
solutions. To take just one example, when working with a difficult-to-recruit but highly relevant 
VDPSOHUXQQLQJDGR]HQXQGHUSRZHUHG³SLORW´VWXGLHVZLWKVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWPHWKRGVDQG
reporting only the ones that worked is not even a plausible option, as it is with students or AMT 
workers. Although it makes acquiring large numbers more difficult, the real-world sample is 
compatible with other characteristics of more valid and reproducible research (e.g., LeBel & 
Peters, 2011), such as taking greater care with the validity and reliability of measures, and pre-
registering hypotheses to guide principled data analysis. Improved practices such as results-blind 
review might also encourage the complete reporting of results from more difficult data sets, even 
if hypotheses are not confirmed, and discourage the practice of scouring the data for unexpected 
findings which are then presented as if anticipated all along (Kerr, 1998). 
The urgency of reproducibility issues in medical research derives QRWMXVWIURPWKDWILHOG¶V
life-or-death stakes, but also because it is a discipline that values research relevance. Clinical 
trials failing to confirm the findings implied by some areas of lab-based study have given a 
strong push forward to research reform in medicine (Begley & Ellis, 2012; Grignolo & Pretorius, 
2016; Turner, Matthews et al., 2008). Most areas of basic social psychology do not have a 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJF\FOHRI³FOLQLFDOWULDOV´RUFRQILUPDWLRQLQDSSOLHGVHWWLQJVNevertheless, it is 
tempting to speculate that if we had paid more attention to the Lewinian process of uptake from 
practical application, we might have had fair warning about some of the well-publicized basic 
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effects in social psychology that have proven hard to replicate in other labs (e.g., behavioural 
priming, Cesario, 2014), and have also scarcely been tested in the field. 
Even more fundamentally, questions of statistical evidence in basic psychology have 
reached an impasse that would be best broken with a dose of relevance. Some argue that 
statistical reporting should be based on effect sizes with confidence intervals around them, rather 
than directional effects significant according to p-value (Cumming et al., 2014). This has 
implications for sample size. To establish a stable effect size, much larger samples are required 
than when establishing a mere directional effect (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Meta-analytic 
integrations of research also find it harder to come to consensus about a typical effect size, 
compared to whether or not the effect plausibly goes in a particular direction (Fabrigar & 
Wegener, 2016; Francis, 2017). Nonetheless, deciding on a target effect size before results are 
known underlies power analysis and Bayesian analysis, necessary tools to satisfy some recent 
journal requirements aimed at improving the evidence base of studies (e.g., Trafimow & Marks, 
2015; Vazire, 2016).  
But dealing with effect sizes is complicated by the fact that, in much basic research, 
measures and contexts are abstract, making standardized effect sizes difficult to benchmark. How 
much happiness is gained, exactly, when increasing 0.3 scale points on a 1-7 scale? 
Psychophysics appears to be the only sub-discipline that has really developed insight into this 
QRWLRQRI³FULWHULDOPDJQLWXGHV´RUKRZPXFKGLIIHUHQFHPDNHVDGLIIHUHQFHHJ:DUG
Meta-analyses of typical social psychological effects certainly vary greatly in size according to 
topic (Richard, Bond & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). Comparisons between similar effects in the lab and 
the field show no consistent strength advantage to either, and there is considerable variability in 
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which setting yields stronger findings, especially in social psychology (Anderson, Lindsay & 
Bushman, 1999; Mitchell, 2012).  
FLQGLQJDQHIIHFWRIDJLYHQVL]HLQWKHODEGRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWWKHVDPHVL]HZLOOEHIRXQGLQ
the real world. When studies are conducted in the real world, the outcomes are more likely to be 
concrete behaviours, decisions, and personal outcomes. Effect size is less difficult to grasp when 
the outcome variables are school grades, money donated to charity, colds not caught, or number 
of jobs applied for. Any of these outcomes, as an unstandardized effect size, is meaningful 
because it provides the basis for a cost-benefit analysis. If the cost is trivial -- for example, 
changing the wording in the next edition of a government leaflet -- then a positive benefit of any 
size justifies iWVDGRSWLRQ,QVKRUWWKH³QHZVWDWLVWLFV´PDNHPRUHVHQVHZKHQGHDOLQJZLWK
measures that live up to criteria of relevance. 
 
A final word on relevance, values, and technocracy 
 
As mentioned earlier, Hillary Clinton brought social psychological research to the forefront 
of relevance in the 2016 US Presidential debates. This was just one of many signals that 
mainstream governmental parties worldwide, both liberal and conservative, have been willing to 
listen to and make use of our science. The Behavioral Insights Team, established by David 
&DPHURQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWLQWKH8. following earlier initiatives by the Blair government, was a so-
called ³QXGJHXQLW´XVLQJEHKDYLRXUDOVFLHQFH (that in the view of Kahneman, as noted earlier in 
this essay, is social psychology) to encourage prosocial choices. The Obama administration was 
beginning to follow suit in the US by establishing the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, now 
apparently discontinued by the Trump administration (Stillman, 2017; Social and Behavioral 
Sciences Team, 2017). Social psychology techniques for persuading people and attitude-
behaviour techniques for getting out the vote were used to an unprecedented degree in both 
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Obama Presidential campaigns (Carey, 2012; Issenberg, 2012), with an advisory panel including 
Susan Fiske, Robert Cialdini, and Richard Thaler. The Hillary Clinton campaign continued this 
HQJDJHPHQWZLWKYRWHUHQFRXUDJHPHQWWHFKQLTXHVGHULYHGVWUDLJKWIURPVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\¶V
own implementation intention theory (Abcarian, 2016). 
We all know how key political campaigns in 2016 ended. Behind the victorious Trump and 
Brexit campaigns lay a different type of research-driven campaign, one based on social media 
rather than personal or phone contact, and targeting voters with different messages based on 
personality rather than social psychology (most notably, Cambridge Analytica; Commons Select 
Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, 2017; Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017). The irony is that 
a resurgent populist right, predicated on a revolt against big government, bureaucrats and 
experts, made its own use of sophisticated behavioural science--and at a fraction of the cost of 
traditional campaigning. The undisputed message of 2016 was the emergence of new rifts pitting 
Establishment politicians against a populist style, on both the right and the left of politics. Social 
psychologists might reasonably feel existential threat. The relevance of our field seems decidedly 
endangered these days, especially given the air of technocracy attributed to some of our flagship 
behavioural interventions.. 
These anxieties have been felt before. Indeed, the crisis period LQWKH¶V also was a 
time of re-examining the ethics of social psychology. With the rise of radical and critical voices 
came a new look at the paradigms of deception and manipulation that characterized such classic 
VWXGLHVDV0LOJUDP¶VREHGLHQFH SDUDGLJPDQGWKH6WDQIRUGSULVRQ³H[SHULPHQW´(WKLFDO
practices and guidelines were recognized as often lacking or inadequate, calling social 
psychology into question not only as a knowledge enterprise but as a moral enterprise (Elms, 
,QWKH¶s, informed consent and debriefing, along with institutional review, were 
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established and generally acknowledged as acceptable procedural and regulatory answers to 
these research issues--with some dissent, largely emanating from behavioural economists who 
objected even to ethically shielded deception research (e.g., Davis & Holt, 1992; Hertwig & 
Ortmann, 2001). Eventually, deception paradigms waned in numbers, without completely 
disappearing (Nicks, Korn & Maineri, 2010).  This decline may simply be a consequence of the 
more general retreat from highly relevant and engaging behavioural designs overall, as already 
noted (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
However, deeper philosophical questions raised by the crisis of ethics were not so easily 
resolved. Although the experiment as a basic-knowledge process is a way to establish causality, 
it also lays the groundwork for the application of manipulations or interventions ± or, in a more 
sinister light, the exercise of power by experts XSRQD³VXEMHFW´JURXS (now, more respectfully, 
FDOOHG³SDUWLFLSDQWV´. No matter how well-intentioned they are, or how similar to everyday 
influence (e.g., Smith, Goldstein & Johnson, 2013), interventions present a problem for values of 
freedom and autonomy. Argyris (1975), writing in the IXOOVZLQJRIWKHILUVW³FULVLV´RIIHUHGD
trenchant analysis of some of the most issue-relevant social psychology research of the time, 
showing how it assumed DZRUOGRIUDWLRQDOLQGLYLGXDOVFRQWUROOLQJHDFKRWKHU³0RGHO,´UDWKHU
than one of free and LQIRUPHGFKRLFH³0RGHO´ 
Moral unease is especially great when forces outside our awareness or beyond our control 
are leveraged to create behavioural change, be they the second-hand )UHXGLDQ³GHSWK
PRWLYDWLRQ´glorified by WKH¶VDGYHUWLVLQJLQGXVtry (Packard, 1957) or the more up-to-date 
heuristics and primes of the cognitive unconscious (e.g., Nairn & Fine, 2008). Indeed, social 
SV\FKRORJ\¶VWXUQWRWKHXQFRQVFLRXVILUVWVHHQDVDZD\of overcoming the limitations of self-
report (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), soon developed into assertions that most human behaviour 
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was determined by automatic forces (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). There followed a wave of 
experimental research in social psychology using surprisingly small-scale environmental changes 
to produce relatively large-scale behavioural changes without participants being aware of the 
influence--for example, increasing creativity by sitting outside versus inside a large cardboard 
ER[LH³WKLQNLQJRXWVLGHWKHER[´/HXQJ, Kim et al., 2012).  The popularity of these 
manipulations creates DORRSKROHLQWKHSXUSRUWHGO\UHVROYHGHWKLFVLVVXHVRIWKH¶V7KH\GR
not outright deceive their participants, nor do they fully disclose the influences on them. While 
there are questions about the replicability of this kind of finding in the wake of the second crisis 
of evidence (Cesario, 2014), it is perhaps reassuring, for advocates of human autonomy, that the 
literature of unconscious influence has seen few applications in field settings. 
One way to resolve these meta-theoretical doubts is to return to a GHHSHUUHDGLQJRI0LOOHU¶V
DGGUHVVPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHU,QKLVYLHZ³JLYLQJDZD\´SV\FKRORJ\LVDOVRDQDFWRIJLYLQJ
XSFRQWUROEHFDXVH³,QWKHSXEOLFYLHZ,VXVSHFWDOOWKLVWDONDERXWFRQWUROOLQJEHKDYLRUFRPHV
across as unpleasant, if not actXDOO\WKUHDWHQLQJ´S,QVWHDG0LOOHUDGYRFDWHVOHWWLQJWKH
public--and practitioners--use our insights as they will, effectively becoming the masters of their 
own intervention. It is through this avenue of communication that basic research could come into 
its own, as long as the concepts in play, such as emotions, morality, how we learn and remember, 
and social issues of current concern, are inherently understandable.  
Most importantly, to convince us to reach out to the outside world, suitable incentives need 
to be there. Real-world relevance should be recognized as a publication-worthy contribution 
alongside theoretical precision and sophistication. Perhaps a fourth section of JPSP could be 
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established, to enshrine highly relevant research at the top of the publishing league.2 Research 
using populations outside the convenient norm should also be given special consideration in 
publication, along with some degree of forgiveness for the restrictions that relevance places on 
the niceties of design. Communication based on a measured view of the literature, addressing 
public curiosity without betraying scientific integrity, should be evaluated and recognized as a 
positive service to the field--not just as a special decoration, but as an everyday activity. It is not 
realistic to expect psychologists to improve their behaviour simply out of a sense of duty. A 
sense of duty is already expressed pro bono in the editorial process and through other forms of 
service to the profession. But with increasing and continuing pressures on all levels of a career, it 
is difficult to ask people to take on much more for the common good. Even when researchers are 
safely ensconced in tenure or full professorship, they still are guided by scholarly habits that 
have not been unlearned from the days of everyday struggle, while now having the career 
interests of their own students and protégés to look after.  
To conclude, ,VXVSHFWWKDWWKHPHWDSKRURID³FULVLV´LVRYHUO\IODWWHULQJWRWKHLPSRUWDQFH
that the field places on relevance. After all, a crisis is a self-evident thing. The word implies that 
everyone knows something bad is going on and realizes something must be done about it. 
Relevance, however, has been less of a crisis in this sense. It has been more of a persistent low-
level worry that stings every time a social psychologist is misidentified as an economist or a 
sociologist,3 or every time we wish that people would listen to what we have to say about some 
social issue. But there have been no signals surroundinJRXUUHOHYDQFH³FULVLV´WKDWZRXOGE\
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thank. 
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themselves spur on action, as rising waters or a marching army of the unemployed would do. 
Investing in the relevance of our field, then, is more of a long-term concern that will ensure our 
respect, increase the chances that governments and businesses will turn to us, and make us feel 
better about ourselves when friends and relatives tell us that they have heard about our research. 
Those who disagree with this analysis are free to do so, but then should commit explicitly 
to a one-way model of influence from basic to applied psychology. Doing this should come with 
the understanding that the one-way model entails a certain lower prestige for applied work, 
because applied work must look to basic work while basic work is not obliged to look back at the 
applied. But iIWKLVSURVSHFWLVXQFRPIRUWDEOHWRWKHUHDGHULI/HZLQ¶VDFWLRQUHVHDUFKDQG
mutuality of regard are things that strike you as worthwhile, I hope my analysis convinces you 
that mere concern is not enough. There is instead a need for concrete incentives designed to 
enhance the prestige of applied research, which would go hand-in-hand with greater visibility of 
applied research, as it can inform the validation and modification of basic-level ideas in social 
psychology.   To achieve that goal, in turn, requires far-sighted leaders who are prepared to make 
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